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THE POLITICS OF COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE AND THE EASTERN 
GERMAN STATES 
Michael D. Kondratick 
Foreign trade is not a specialized activity for a few who 
might engage in it, but it is the very core and even the 
precondition of our economic and social order. 
Introduction 
The concept of comparative advantage is 
one of the simplest, but most often misunder-
stood, principles of economics. Succinctly stat-
ed, a country possesses a comparative advan-
tage in a good if the opportunity cost of 
producing that good in terms of other goods is 
lower in that country than it is in other coun-
tries. If a comparative advantage is held, that 
country should then produce and trade that 
good. A closely related concept is that of 
absolute advantage. A country has an absolute 
advantage in producing a good if it can do so 
using fewer resources than another country. 
(Krugman, p. 18) While it is true that a coun-
try need not have an absolute advantage in the 
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production of any goods, it is a proven eco-
nomic fact that each country must have a com-
parative advantage. Yet, as Paul Krugman and 
Maurice Obstfeld note in their textbook 
International Economics, even the Wall Street 
Journal, the epitome of economic and financial 
reporting, published an article making the 
emphatic claim that "many small countries 
have no comparative advantage in anything." 
("Survey ... ," p. 16) 
This misconception was observed during 
the Martindale Center's excursion to Germany 
in the spring of 1997, as I attempted to learn 
more about the comparative advantage of 
Eastern Germany. During this trip, scholars 
and academics were asked to provide their 
insights on this issue. On several occasions, 
statistics were quoted as "evidence" that no 
comparative advantage existed, such as the fact 
that only 3 percent of Eastern German manu-
facturers' output is easily tradable. ("The 
Eagle's Embrace," p. 21) 
In this essay, I will show that Eastern 
Germany does indeed reflect the long-standing 
rule of comparative advantage, despite the near 
constant political turmoil that has character-
ized its role in world trade over the last half-
century. The sources of comparative advantage 
will be tracked over time, from the era of com-
munist occupation, to Eastern Germany's tran-
sition to reunification and, lastly, to a unified 
Germany in 1995. 
Basis of Eastern German 
Comparative Advantage: 1950s and 
1960s 
The development of a comparative advan-
tage in the Eastern German States during the 
years of communist rule, 1948-1989, has little, 
if any, basis in economic theory. Instead, it was 
determined by the strong arm of Soviet rule. 
Cold War strategy and the amorphous political 
and economic landscape of the Communist 
Bloc took precedence over productivity advan-
tages or favorable wage levels in determining 
the direction and composition of trade. 
Immediately following the establishment 
of the German Democratic Republic (CDR), the 
Soviet Union began a campaign of forced eco-
nomic development. The CDR rapidly became 
an industrialized economy, fueled by imports of 
steel and crude oil from the Soviets. (Snell, pp. 
558-59) To be sure, the Eastern States did con-
tain a healthy industrial base prior to Soviet con-
trol. In fact, the East possessed a higher per 
capita industrial output level than the West. 
Most of this output was focused on consumer 
goods and chemicals, which were procured from 
large reserves of brown coal. (Snell, p. 558) 
The Soviets reconfigured the CDR's indus-
trial orientation to meet the immediate needs 
of the other Eastern command economies. To 
measure the degree of the economy's reconfig-
uration, consider that in 1956 the railroad 
rolling stock, shipbuilding, and metallurgical 
equipment industries were operating at, respec-
tively, four times, fifteen times, and eleven 
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times their 1939 levels. (Snell, p. 571) During 
the 1950s, these changes required the CDR to 
sacrifice consumption for a larger amount of 
fixed capital investment. (Snell, p. 562) With 
this increased investment, the CDR became a 
catalyst for turning the ever-increasing supplies 
of Soviet steel into machinery and heavy indus-
trial equipment. (Snell, p. 558) This led to a 
consistent trade surplus in machinery, equip-
ment, transport, industrial consumer goods, 
and chemicals. (Smyser, p. 225) Obviously, with 
a large proportion of Soviet resources being 
devoted to industrial output, the consumer 
goods and agricultural sectors suffered from a 
lack of investment. (Snell, p. 576) 
In the context of free trade, comparative 
advantage theory dictates that, if industrial 
goods were being traded by East Germany, then 
productivity levels must have been high enough 
to allow those goods to be produced at a lower 
cost. Yet, the CDR's industrial production was 
decidedly inefficient and wasteful due to a focus 
on increasing output amidst burgeoning costs. 
For example, consumption of steel in the CDR 
rose much faster than machinery production 
due to obsolete process designs and the instal-
lation of the outmoded equipment. (Snell, 
p. 582) Another sign of inefficiency was the 
high inventory levels of East German firms. 
These stocks were composed of a substantial 
volume of unsalable goods. This caused indus-
trial inventories to increase at a rate of nine per-
cent per year from 1955 to 1965, faster than 
that in any other European country. (Snell, 
p. 583) Furthermore, because trade relation-
ships among Eastern Bloc nations were man-
aged by the Soviets through the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), CDR pro-
ducers had no incentive to achieve efficiencies. 
They did not have to compete, either domesti-
cally or internationally, or develop and defend 
any markets. (Smyser, p. 151) 
Development of Trade During the 
1970s and 1980s 
Three-quarters of all East German trade 
was conducted with the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe during the era of communist 
rule. The late 1970s and early 1980s, however, 
ushered in significant changes to the CDR's 
trade relations. During this period, the Soviet 
Union was forced to limit its deliveries to the 
countries within the Eastern Bloc. Because 
these deliveries supplied the steel and oil 
required to operate its industries, the lapse in 
their provision caused the CDR economy to 
grind to a halt. Furthermore, the consistently 
lower prices under which the CDR was able to 
import goods from other Eastern Bloc nations 
began to disappear. Because the CDR was an 
inefficient industrial producer, as previously 
noted, the prices of its exports on foreign mar-
kets declined. The combination of these two 
factors thus generated a rapid deterioration in 
the CDR's terms of trade. (Melzer, p. 147) 
In order to generate higher prices for its 
exports on international markets, Eastern 
Germany was forced to redevelop what had 
become a dilapidated economy under the over-
bearing output demands of the Soviet Union. 
However, as just described, the supply link to 
the Soviets was thinning out, casting doubt 
upon its ability to help in this effort. The CDR 
had no choice but to look toward the West. East 
Germany accepted extensive credits from 
Western countries to import the know-how 
needed for it to modernize. This caused the 
CDR's foreign debt levels to rise to problemat-
ic levels, reaching $14 billion by the early 
1980s, $10 billion of which was owed to 
Western banks. (Melzer, p. 134) 
The effort to modernize yielded minimal 
results, however, primarily because the CDR 
existed as a centrally planned economy (CPE). 
CPEs generally are not given to experiencing 
gains in efficiency. Because directions are given 
from above and executed from below, opportu-
nities for innovation at the operational level are 
meager. Also, with wage levels essentially frozen 
in the CDR, motivating workers in an effort to 
increase productivity was difficult. Lastly, the 
CDR's policy goal of maintaining full employ-
ment virtually assured low productivity because 
of both the diseconomies of scale that developed 
in an attempt to employ too many people and 
the lack of competition for each position. If any 
advancements were made in the productivity of 
capital, employment rates would not decline 
accordingly, resulting in the under-utilization 
of labor. Even though the CDR drastically 
improved its programs to train its labor, there 
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was often a disparity between worker qualifica-
tions and positions held. (Melzer, p. 165) 
In order to reduce its foreign indebtedness, 
East Germany was forced to accept economic 
austerity by reducing imports from the West. 
(Melzer, p. 148) A dilemma materialized. How 
could the CDR obtain, at an acceptable price, 
the imports it required to operate its industries 
when the advantages of trade with the East had 
been limited and any further imports from the 
West would result in unrealistic levels of debt? 
How could foreign debt be reduced when East 
German goods were not well received in 
Western markets? The CDR did not have to look 
far for the solution - the expansion of trade 
with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 
East Germany was able to acquire badly 
needed inputs without exacerbating its foreign 
debt position due to several key features of 
inter-German trade. By shifting its focus from 
other Western nations to West German suppli-
ers, the CDR could take advantage of interest-
free swing credits. These credits, common in 
bilateral exchange, are extended by banks of 
participating countries to guarantee the recip-
rocal flow of payments despite inevitable tem-
porary imbalances in trade accounts. 
Therefore, the CDR was able to purchase goods 
from the FRG throughout the early 1980s with-
out immediately selling goods of equivalent 
value. By the end of 1982, the FRG had become 
the CDR's second biggest trading partner next 
to the Soviet Union. (Garland, p. 174) In addi-
tion to preferential trade agreements, a num-
ber of contractual arrangements were reached 
between the East and West that resulted in a 
large inflow of D-mark hard currency to the 
CDR. These arrangements included the pay-
ment of transit fees to the CDR, investment in 
East German roads and canals, and payment for 
the services of trash and sewage removal. 
(Garland, p. 173) 
East Germany also benefited from the fact 
that the FRG did not view inter-German trade 
as foreign trade and, hence, did not subject 
Eastern goods to normal trade regulations. 
Intermediate and manufactured goods from the 
CDR could enter the FRG duty-free, and CDR 
agricultural exports to the FRG were exempt 
from the European Economic Community's 
(EEC) compensatory levies. (Garland, p. 173) 
The circumvention of the financial and regula-
tory standards that governed world trade thus 
worked to drastically alter East Germany's com-
parative advantage. 
Several major shifts in the composition of 
the CDR's imports and exports became evident 
as it increased trade with the FRG. Mechanical 
and electrical engineering products such as 
heavy equipment and machinery had been, as 
previously noted, East Germany's comparative 
advantage and primary export to the Eastern 
Bloc. These products garnered only a small 
portion of the FRG market, however, primarily 
because they were specialized for the needs of 
other Eastern nations. (Garland, p. 184) 
Textiles, clothing, and agriculture, areas 
of the economy that had traditionally received 
little investment, rapidly became the CDR's 
biggest exports to the FRG by 1982. Textiles 
and clothing were exported to the FRG at three 
times the rate they were imported. Agricultural 
products represented the CDR's third largest 
export to the FRG. This occurred mainly 
because of the absence of EEC levies and the 
lack of protectionism found in other Western 
markets. (Garland, pp. 185-86) 
Germany's Comparative Advantage 
and the Transition to Reunification 
Thus far, I have shown that the historical 
development of the Eastern States' comparative 
advantage in mechanical and electrical engi-
neering goods developed amidst a battle 
between political and economic forces. 
Likewise, an accurate view of the current sta-
tus of Eastern Germany's comparative advan-
tage requires an understanding of the political, 
economic, and regulatory decisions surround-
ing German reunification. 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and 
the economic union of Germany in July 1990, 
the East was liberated from the heavy-handed-
ness of the Soviet Union and the rigidities of a 
centrally planned economy. However, the poli-
tics that clouded the issue of Eastern Germany's 
comparative advantage remained. Instead of the 
Soviets overtly determining the East's compar-
ative advantage, the West German government 
and the agency charged with privatizing the 
Eastern economy (the Treuhandanstalt or 
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Treuhand) limited the sources of Eastern 
German comparative advantage in a more sub-
tle manner. These limitations were a by-prod-
uct of the effort to ease the many political prob-
lems encountered in unifying the nation. These 
political problems were generated because of the 
Federal Republic's determination not to sacri-
fice widely-held cultural beliefs. Paramount 
among these beliefs was solidarity. The 
Constitution itself calls for the "unity of living 
standards in the federal territory." But unifica-
tion with an antiquated economy clearly posed 
a threat to this ideal. The only prudent course 
of action for the West, then, was to remake the 
Eastern States in its image as quickly as possi-
ble. ("The Eagle's Embrace," p. 21) 
The two decisions associated with the 
drive for solidarity which had the greatest 
impact on comparative advantage were the con-
version of the East German mark for the D-
mark on a one-to-one basis and the move to 
equalize wage levels between the East and West 
within a few years after reunification. The one-
to-one valuation decision caused the Eastern 
currency to appreciate by 300 percent to 400 
percent. (Smyser, p. 154) As previously noted, 
East German goods were not well received in 
markets outside of Eastern Europe due to their 
poor quality. The valuation decision made these 
shoddy goods prohibitively expensive while 
simultaneously placing them in the midst of 
intense international competition. Clearly this 
put Eastern German exporters at a major dis-
advantage. The movement to equalize wage lev-
els was engineered by powerful West German 
unions, who feared a flood of low priced labor 
into the West. These unions were successful in 
organizing Eastern labor and negotiating con-
tracts with employers that secured pay close to 
that received by Western counterparts. They 
also argued for the complete equalization of 
wages by 1994 or 1995. Unfortunately, the 
Treuhand succumbed to union pressures. As it 
sold off Eastern German companies, it required 
that prospective buyers maintain a minimum 
number of jobs. (Smyser, p. 168) 
These politically motivated decisions 
robbed the Eastern States of a potentially strong 
competitive base. The East possessed a work 
force skilled in engineering and technical tasks, 
which developed as a result of the production 
of industrial goods for the Soviet Union. 
(Janssen, p. 40) Prior to reunification, Eastern 
workers were only 33 percent to 50 percent as 
productive as their Western counterparts, and 
the difference in the average industrial wage 
had reflected this. In 1988, the average indus-
trial wage was 1,292 East marks in the CDR and 
3,657 D-marks in the FRG. (Smyser, p. 151) 
(Although these low wage costs offset lower pro-
ductivity, the inefficient production methods 
discussed earlier caused other costs to rise. 
This had required the Soviet Union to manu-
facture East Germany's advantage through 
managed trade.) Mter reunification, wage lev-
els gradually headed toward equalization, caus-
ing labor costs to double by 1992 while pro-
ductivity increased by only 33 percent. These 
high wage costs and the aforementioned strong 
currency combined to increase the price of 
industrial products, impeding the region's abil-
ity to trade them in the highly competitive mar-
kets outside of the Eastern Bloc. Furthermore, 
high labor costs caused potential investors in 
Eastern Germany to begin looking elsewhere to 
establish production facilities. Daimler-Benz 
and Volkswagen looked to the U.S. and France, 
respectively, for the construction of new facili-
ties. Investors faced a market -determined price 
for their products but could not control a major 
cost of production. (Smyser, p. 182) 
Besides overvalued products and labor, 
several other barriers to investment continue 
to exist. The first is the debate over the rights 
to property seized by the Soviets from 1945 to 
1949. As claims on land proliferate and are sub-
stantiated in court, investors are becoming 
wary about the security of their purchases. 
Furthermore, although it was improving rapid-
ly, the infrastructure in the East is still not up 
to Western standards, leaving investors worried 
over the quality and availability of telephone 
service and other utilities. (Smyser, p. 180) The 
regulatory framework in Germany is also com-
plex. Environmental legislation alone includes 
some 800 laws, 2, 770 ordinances, and 4, 700 
administrative provisions. Lastly, the German 
business environment is saddled with a costly, 
complex tax structure. Subsidiaries of foreign 
corporations can be subjected to a 42 percent 
corporate tax and an additional trade tax of 
between 13 percent and 20 percent. Further-
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more, high taxes are placed on branches estab-
lished by start-up businesses. (Heymann, p. 26) 
These barriers to investment are substan-
tial. Private investment was required to 
enhance the productivity of Eastern firms with 
unrealistically high wage levels in order to cre-
ate a comparative advantage. With private 
investment limited in the years following reuni-
fication, the federal government was forced to 
devote steadily increasing amounts of financial 
resources for investment and expenditure in the 
East. (Smyser, p. 184) In the early 1990s, 
increasing expenditures caused government 
budget deficits, which stimulated demand and 
caused higher prices in the East. These effects, 
combined with the higher wage costs, alarmed 
the Bundesbank, which subsequently raised the 
short term interest rate to prevent inflation. 
Higher short term rates caused long term inter-
est rates to stay at high levels. And as the cost 
of obtaining capital climbed, investors had yet 
another reason to steer clear of Eastern 
Germany. Also, with investable resources flow-
ing elsewhere, the ability of banks to support 
ventures in the East waned. (Smyser, p. 195) 
Government transfers, such as unem-
ployment compensation and social security pay-
ments, while trying to compensate for the 
investment barriers stunting growth, actually 
create another hindrance to the development 
of a comparative advantage. Most of these 
transfers are spent on consumption, rather than 
investment. This increased consumption is 
largely spent on nontradable goods, such as 
construction and services, while the manufac-
turing sector, where tradable goods are pro-
duced, remains weak. 
Development of Comparative 
Advantage in the Eastern States in 
the 1990s 
The comparative advantage of the Eastern 
States since 1990 has been developed into a 
mirror image of that of the West. This is the 
result of a combination of two distinct factors. 
The first factor is that the export base of the 
East is not unlike that of the West. The second 
factor is that both regions face viable markets 
for their products. Almost 50 percent of 
Eastern trade is still centered on the fledgling, 
yet rapidly expanding, markets of Eastern and 
Central Europe. ("External Trade ... ") Eastern 
German products have maintained a foothold 
in countries such as Poland and Hungary due 
to the relationships developed during the com-
munist period. Eastern Germany still largely 
maintains an advantage in industrial goods pro-
duction with these countries due to its former 
role as a center of industrial production in the 
Communist Bloc. This relative advantage is 
large enough to drive trade and overcome the 
distorted labor costs that resulted from the 
push for solidarity. ("The Labor Market") 
The comparative advantage of Western 
Germany is centered on technologically 
advanced finished products, which is similar to 
that of the East. These products include main-
ly automobiles, chemical products, and electri-
cal and mechanical engineering products. 
These goods are efficiently produced (which 
allows for higher wages) and of the highest 
quality. Western German companies closely 
monitor their international competition and 
take advantage of the newest technologies in an 
effort to react quickly and maintain the 
exchangeable value of their products. 
("Branches of Industry") 
A common misconception concerning 
Western Germany's export sector is that it is 
fueled by larger companies such as Daimler-
Benz, Bayer, and Siemens. Whereas these com-
panies are an integral part of the West's inter-
national success, it is actually the small and 
middle sized firms, referred to as the 
Mittelstand, that promote the entrepreneurship 
and innovation needed to keep German goods 
in demand on foreign markets. (Keithly, p. 381) 
The chemical industry has only three large 
firms, Bayer, BASF, and Hoechst, which are 
accompanied by a host of smaller firms. 
Furthermore, of the nearly 7,000 production 
facilities dedicated to mechanical engineering, 
90 percent employ fewer than 300 people. 
("Branches of Industry") 
Eastern Germany also possesses a large 
number of Mittelstand firms. As of 1994, these 
firms numbered 450,000, approximately 10,000 
of which are engaged in manufacturing. 
Other sectors of small businesses comple-
ment theMittelstand. As of 1995, 500,000 sole 
proprietorships existed, employing 3.4 million 
18 
people. The East also maintains a very strong 
craft and trades sector among its smaller firms. 
The craft and trades sector is key in providing 
the intermediate goods that serve as the com-
ponents for industrial manufacturers. Glass 
and metal used in automobiles are examples of 
these intermediate goods. This sector has pro-
vided the impetus for growth, with the number 
of firms increasing from 82,000 at the end of 
the central planning era to 147,000 in 1994, 
with a total workforce of 1.2 million. In 1996, 
the sector grew by 3.5 percent in the East. 
("Crafts and Trades") It is clear that the export 
base of both the East and West is founded on 
the production of industrial goods through 
small and middle sized firms. 
There are two reasons why both the 
German government and private investors are 
dedicated to developing the Mittelstand firms in 
the East that are focused on the production of 
high-tech industrial goods. First, there are a 
large number of successful small industrial 
enterprises in Germany (indeed, 75 percent of 
all industrial firms in Germany fall into this clas-
sification). The promotion of more competition 
in this area, then, is likely to create streamlined 
production and greater efficiency in Eastern 
firms. ("Technology") Also, because wages tend 
to be rising more quickly than productivity, 
investors are forced to choose a sector to invest 
in where the productivity gap can be closed most 
quickly. Since Eastern German workers already 
have a strong background in engineering and 
technical processes, high-tech industry seems 
to be a logical choice. (Smyser, p. 152) 
There are many government programs for 
Mittelstand development in the East that are 
focused on counteracting the various invest-
ment barriers within the German economy as 
described previously. For example, up to 10 
percent of investments in small and middle 
sized firms (firms with fewer than 250 employ-
ees) are tax deductible. Also, assets of small 
firms are exempt from any net worth tax until 
the end of 1998. Furthermore, any equity 
invested in, or money loaned to, small compa-
nies before December 1998 is exempt from any 
capital gains taxes. Credit programs exist, 
administered by the states, to help with any liq-
uidity difficulties. Through the promotion of 
more foreign investment, the government is 
hoping to compensate for the fact that most of 
its transfers are directed toward consumption. 
Government assistance is provided in sev-
eral research and development activities includ-
ing the hiring and retention of personnel in 
R&D, the creation of new products and process-
es, and the building of an infrastructure for the 
transfer of technology. ("More Jobs to be 
Created ... ") The government is also helping 
smaller craft enterprises maintain competi-
tiveness through the provision of low interest 
loans and financial assistance for those in the 
pursuit of master craftsmen certifications. 
("Crafts and Trades") 
Export figures for 1995 reveal the simi-
larity in the comparative advantage that has 
developed in both the East and West. Final 
products, specifically electrical engineering 
products and machinery, were a crucial source 
of international competitiveness for the West, 
representing 72 percent of exports. Final indus-
trial goods were also the top export of the East, 
representing 56 percent of its total. 
Intermediate goods, generated through craft 
and trades firms, were the second biggest export 
for both regions at 19.6 percent and 15.6 per-
cent of Eastern and Western totals, respective-
ly. (Federal Statistical Office, p. 300) 
The Future of Eastern German 
Comparative Advantage 
The comparative advantage of Eastern 
Germany in intermediate and final industrial 
goods looks as though it will be maintained in 
the years to come, as it aggressively courts large 
manufacturers to complement the Mittlestand. 
For example, Siemens has recently established 
a $1.7 billion state-of-the-art silicon chip fac-
tory in Dresden. ("Is Eastern ... ," p. 57) 
Siemens is exploiting what may have been one 
of the most rapidly developing sectors of the old 
CDR economy around the time of reunification. 
With 100 as the 1970 base, the production 
indices for the electrotechnical and precision 
mechanics industries in 1988 were 872 and 520, 
respectively. (Smyser, p. 153) In addition to 
Siemens, Dow Chemical has established a plant 
in the city of Buna, in the middle of Saxony-
Anhalt's dilapidated chemical triangle, that will 
allow for the modern production of plastic and 
19 
basic chemicals. Furthermore, Opel has estab-
lished a manufacturing plant in Eisenach, in 
the state of Thuringia. ("Is Eastern ... ," p. 57) 
This plant uses just-in-time production tech-
niques and requires only 19 hours of direct and 
indirect labor to produce an automobile, mak-
ing it Europe's second most efficient car plant. 
(Stokes, p. 1645) 
The Mittelstand should also be bolstered 
in the near future. In 1996 the government 
allocated $67 4 million for use by young entre-
preneurs as venture capital available through 
banks and other financial institutions. Those 
prepared to take the risk of setting up their own 
businesses are eligible for corporate income, 
trade, and company tax relief over a three-year 
period or have the option of writing off invest-
ments against their tax liability. (Menke-
Gluckert, p. 14) 
The government is also instituting other 
tax reforms to promote investment, which will 
take effect at the beginning of 1998. For exam-
ple, the maximum tax rate on business income 
will then be reduced from 47 percent to 40 per-
cent, and the tax rate on retained earnings will 
be decreased from 45 percent to 40 percent. 
(Endres and Ditsch, p. 37) 
Conclusion 
Contrary to the assertions of the scholars 
and academics described in the introduction, 
Eastern Germany does indeed have a compara-
tive advantage. As the situation discussed has 
shown, the production of industrial goods has 
been a stronghold of the region's economy since 
the infancy of the communist occupation, 
although it has always been shrouded in polit-
ical wrangling. 
The existence of aMittelstand is providing 
a spark of enthusiasm for the continued creation 
of products with tradable value. This spark of 
enthusiasm may yet lead to an explosion of 
exports. Mter all, investment levels in the East 
are higher now than they were in the West dur-
ing the "Economic Miracle" that characterized 
the recovery following World War II. In priva-
tizing 40,000 companies, the Treuhand created 
over DM 210 billion in investment commit-
ments in the East. By the year 2000, the East's 
infrastructure will be nearly as developed as the 
West's. For example, the new states will have 96 
percent and 94 percent of the capital stock of 
the West in telecommunications and energy, 
respectively. ("The Eagle's Embrace," p. 58) 
Furthermore, unions are beginning to relax 
their demands for wage increases in hopes of 
safeguarding jobs. The combination of these 
factors has the potential to bring productivity 
back into line with wage levels and that result 
would yield continued increases in internation-
al competitiveness. Only then can the ideal of 
solidarity fostered by the Constitution and the 
social and economic order sought by Ludwig 
Erhard finally be achieved. 
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